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The recent ﬁnancial crisis and the subsequent economic downturn have clearly
shown the importance of ﬁnancial stability. Since the onset of the slump in
2008, resolving strategies and regulatory measures aimed at preventing future
crises have been on the top of the political agenda worldwide. However, given
the high degree of complexity of the issue, the factors causing ﬁnancial crises
are hard to identify. The various ﬁnancial crisis episodes during the 20th cen-
tury suggest that many diﬀerent determinants, such as particular institutional
settings, policy failures, and structural peculiarities, may all have a crucial
impact.
Among the diﬀerent strands of literature, the role of market structure
emerges as a crucial topic. More precisely, the impact of competition and
market concentration on the probability of a ﬁnancial crisis appears to be of
primary interest. Remarkably, two opposing theories are currently debated. A
positive relationship between market concentration and ﬁnancial system stabil-
ity is observed when more concentrated markets allow banks to earn higher prof-
its, which serve as a buﬀer against unexpected shocks (concentration-stability
hypothesis). On the contrary, higher market concentration is associated with
lower ﬁnancial stability when market power induces banks to charge higher in-
terest rates to borrowers, so that borrowers take excessive risks and raise the
risk of default and destabilization (concentration-fragility hypothesis).1
While the predictions of theory are ambiguous, the majority of recent empir-
ical studies supports the concentration-stability hypothesis. Beck et al. (2006)
is among the ﬁrst and few studies that analyze the impact of market concentra-
tion on the likelihood of ﬁnancial crises. The authors use data on 69 countries
from 1980 to 1997 and ﬁnd that countries with more concentrated banking sys-
tems are less prone to crises. Chang et al. (2008) study the impact of banking
concentration on non performing loans, using Brazilian bank data for the period
2000 to 2005, and report similar results. In a study on the impact of deposit
insurance on banking system stability, Demirg¨ uc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002)
also ﬁnd that higher concentration is associated with a lower crisis probabil-
ity. Evrensel (2008) uses data on 79 countries for the period 1980-1997 and
shows that concentration in the banking sector enhances the survival time, i.e.
the period during which a country is not experiencing a crisis. Ruiz-Porras
(2008) investigates the relationship between banking competition and ﬁnancial
fragility, using data for 47 countries between 1990 and 1997. However, concen-
tration turns out to be insigniﬁcant in this study.
With the current concern that banks have become too big (“too-big-to-fail”),
these results are quite surprising. Moreover, all the studies estimate the direct
eﬀect of concentration on ﬁnancial stability. Taking the theoretical literature
seriously, however, means to scrutinize the indirect impact of concentration on
ﬁnancial stability, the eﬀects which run via speciﬁc channels. According to
theory, the two channel variables of returns in banking on the one hand and
1For a more detailed discussion of the diﬀerent theoretical models, see for example Beck et
al. (2006) and Beck (2008).
1interest margins on the other hand need to be distinguished. In addition, the
causal chains ranging from concentration to ﬁnancial crises through the two
diﬀerent channels suggest using a systems approach for empirical estimation.
The present paper aims at bringing the empirical literature into agreement
with the underlying theory. We set up a simultaneous system in order to jointly
estimate ﬁnancial stability and the relevant channel variables as endogenous
variables. As it is common in the literature, we estimate ﬁnancial stability us-
ing a binary variable indicating a ﬁnancial crisis if it takes the value of one and
zero otherwise. The main contribution of the paper is to provide a consistent
empirical analysis of the two main hypotheses which are motivated by the the-
oretical literature. In particular, we investigate the indirect eﬀects of market
concentration on the likelihood of a ﬁnancial crisis. We use a new database by
Laeven and Valencia (2008) which covers data on ﬁnancial crises between 1970
and 2007 and allows to adopt a panel approach.
We ﬁnd that both channel eﬀects from theory can be conﬁrmed by the
estimations. This suggests that a direct estimation of the eﬀect of concentra-
tion is unlikely to give a precise result. Furthermore, once we control for the
channel variables, there is no direct eﬀect of market concentration on systemic
crisis. The results of the two-stage and the GMM regressions show evidence
of both the concentration-stability and the concentration-fragility hypothesis,
though the results for the former are more signiﬁcant. In order to take ac-
count of the diﬀerences between developed and developing countries, we split
the sample and estimate the regressions separately. For developing countries,
we ﬁnd strong evidence for the concentration-stability hypothesis, but no ev-
idence for the concentration-fragility hypothesis. In addition, in developing
countries the results suggest that higher concentration is associated with lower
net interest margins. In developed countries, the evidence for the concentration-
stability hypothesis is signiﬁcant. Furthermore, there is also evidence for the
concentration-fragility hypothesis.
Our paper is closely related to the above-mentioned literature. In addition,
it relates to a broader strand of studies on systemic risk and stability in the
macroeconomic context.2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the channels through which concentration is supposed to aﬀect ﬁnancial sta-
bility in more detail. Section 3 outlines the data and explains the econometric
methodology. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 takes a closer look on
the diﬀerences between developing and developed countries. Section 6 discusses
the main results, and ﬁnally section 7 concludes.
2 Channel eﬀects
We focus on two channels, motivated by the literature, through which con-
centration aﬀects the probability that a ﬁnancial crisis occurs. In particular,
we want to test the “concentration-stability” and “concentration-fragility” hy-
2See for example Gai et al. (2007, 2008), Summers (2000), Rogoﬀ (1999) and Reinhart
and Rogoﬀ (2009), amongst others.
2potheses. According to the concentration-stability view, higher market concen-
tration enhances the stability of the ﬁnancial system. One line of argument
suggests that, due to higher market concentration, ﬁrms have more market
power and may therefore generate higher proﬁts. In a similar way, it is stated
that higher proﬁts increase the franchise value of ﬁrms, see Chang et al. (2008).
This will induce managers to take less excessive risks, which enhances the sta-
bility of the entire system and suggests a positive relationship between market
concentration and ﬁnancial system stability.3
On the contrary, the concentration-fragility hypothesis predicts that higher
market concentration destabilizes the system and makes it more vulnerable.
According to Boyd and De Nicol´ o (2005), banks in a more concentrated market
(and with more market power) may charge higher loan rates to borrowers than
under (more) competition. In this case, borrowers will take higher risks, which
is a problem for system stability. Moreover, the “too-big-to-fail” property of
some banks might lead to excessive risk taking in banking causing increased
system instability.
Since the concentration-stability hypothesis assumes that concentration af-
fects system stability or, put diﬀerently, the probability of a ﬁnancial crisis,
through higher proﬁts, we will refer to this channel as the proﬁtability channel.
The concentration-fragility view suggests that the eﬀect of higher concentration
works through higher loan rates. We will therefore denote this as the interest
rate channel. Proﬁtability is measured by the return on assets, a standard prof-
itability measure in the literature. The most suitable measure to proxy for the
interest rate channel would be the loan rate of banks. However, since data on
loan rates are quite limited, we use net interest margin instead.4
The following equations summarize the idea of the channels and illustrate
the link between the major variables formally. The probability of a ﬁnancial
crisis is a function (f) of the two channel variables, i.e. return on asset (roa)
and net interest margin (nim), and a set of control variables X.
crisis = f(roa,nim,X) (1)
The return on assets is determined by i) market concentration (the variable
which is of most interest here) and ii) a set of other variables, summarized in
Y .
roa = g(conc,Y ) (2)
Similar to the return on assets, net interest margin is determined by i) market
concentration and ii) a set of other variables, denoted as Z.
nim = h(conc,Z) (3)
3Another line of argument mentioned in Beck et al. (2006) in favor of the concentration-
stability hypothesis is that a more concentrated system with fewer institutions is easier to
monitor than a system with many banks.
4Net interest margin equals interest income minus interest expense divided by interest-
bearing assets.
3For the determinants of the channel variables we mainly follow the existing
literature.5 Similar to Athanasoglou et al. (2008), we include bank speciﬁc
characteristics, such as the cost income ratio or bank size, industry related
factors like market concentration or stock market turnover, and macroeconomic
conditions, such as the per capita GDP growth or inﬂation.
The concentration-stability hypothesis suggests, ceteris paribus, a negative
eﬀect of market concentration on the likelihood of a systemic crisis. The chan-
nels further imply a positive link between concentration and return on assets
and a negative relation between return on assets and the probability of a crisis.










According to the concentration-fragility hypothesis market concentration
enhances the probability of a systemic crisis. Further, the channel mechanism
we look at suggests a positive link between concentration and net interest mar-










From 4 and 5 we see that the two eﬀects of concentration on the probability
of a ﬁnancial crisis are indeed exactly opposite, which can only be detected in
the data by using an appropriate system equation approach.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
Our sample covers 160 countries over 38 years in the period 1970-2007. Data
on ﬁnancial crises are taken from the database by Laeven and Valencia (2008),
which contains data on systemic banking crises, currency crises, and sovereign
debt crises for 1970-2007. We focus on systemic banking crises, which the
authors describe as follows:
“[...], in a systemic banking crisis, a country’s corporate and ﬁnan-
cial sectors experience a large number of defaults and ﬁnancial in-
stitutions and corporations face great diﬃculties repaying contracts
on time. As a result, non-performing loans increase sharply and all
or most of the aggregate banking system capital is exhausted. [...]”
Crisis data are given by a simple binary variable that equals one if a country
i at time t experiences a ﬁnancial crisis, and zero otherwise.6 In total, the data
cover 124 (systemic) banking crises, 208 currency crises, and 63 sovereign debt
crisis episodes, where a subset of 42 are twin crises.7 Financial data are mainly
5See for example Bourke (1989), Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Demirg¨ uc-Kunt and
Huizinga (1999) or Athanasoglou et al. (2008).
6Note that time t denotes the year when the crisis starts.
7For further details on the data, see Laeven and Valencia (2008).
4taken from Beck et al. (2000, updated 2009). Macroeconomic data come from
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database.8
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables, including
the number of observations, mean values, standard deviations as well as the
value for the minimum and maximum.9
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
sys cris 6080 0.0203947 0.141358 0 1
roa 1999 0.0125097 0.0258641 -0.4331444 0.1618286
nim 1938 0.0540555 0.0385981 0.0066786 0.4204413
conc 1999 0.7064695 0.2054826 0.1483518 1
The sample has three peculiarities. First, the overall sample covers more
developing countries than developed countries. However, due to the lack of data
for some variables in developing countries, the included number of observations
is not so diﬀerent in both cases.10 In order to account of the uneven size of
sub-samples, we form sub-samples to run the regressions for diﬀerent income
groups separately. Second, the number of observations for systemic ﬁnancial
crisis is not very high. While the maximum number of included observations
is 1938, which is the maximum number for the right-hand variables, 124 of the
total number of observations refer to systemic ﬁnancial crisis observations, i.e.
they express that “a particular country faces a ﬁnancial crisis in a speciﬁc point
in time (year).” We also checked how data on ﬁnancial crises are distributed
among developed and developing countries. Of the 124 observations on sys-
temic ﬁnancial crises, 17 observations belong to developed countries, while the
remaining 107 entries refer to crises in developing countries. A third issue is the
variation in the number of observations. As usual in empirical studies in this
ﬁeld, the availability of data for the diﬀerent variables varies quite remarkably.
Macroeconomic indicators are available for most countries and time periods. Fi-
nancial sector data such as return on asset, net interest margins, capital market
turnover, ﬁnancial sector average cost-income ratios or indicators on the degree
of market concentration often are available either for a particular group of coun-
tries or for recent years, only. While the latter case simply leads to a smaller
sample size, the former limitation may be more diﬃcult to deal with. This
is in particular the case if an increase in the number of explanatory variables
changes the sample such that the ratio of developed and developing countries
changes signiﬁcantly. We will speciﬁcally consider this issue in selecting the
speciﬁcations, which we discuss below.
Table 2 presents the correlations between systemic crisis, the channel vari-
ables and market concentration. As suggested by the system-stability hypoth-
esis, the correlation between proﬁtability (roa) and ﬁnancial crisis is negative.
8Variables description and sources are given in the Appendix.
9The full descriptive statistics can be found in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
10Note that we refer to countries as developed countries if the World Bank income group
is high income. All remaining World Bank income groups (low income, lower middle income,
upper middle income) are subsumed in one group which we denote as developing countries.
5In line with the concentration-fragility hypothesis, the correlation between net
interest margins (nim) and the likelihood of a ﬁnancial crisis is positive. Since
we are interested in the eﬀect of market concentration on the likelihood of ﬁ-
nancial crises, we must also consider the relation between the particular channel
variables and market concentration. As we can see from the table, all the coef-
ﬁcients are positive, which is in line with the theoretical predictions that higher
market concentration is associated with higher proﬁts and higher interest rates
charged to borrowers.
Table 2: Cross-correlation table
Variables sys cris roa nim conc
sys cris 1.000
roa -0.0419 1.000
nim 0.0554 0.3215 1.000
conc -0.0178 0.1559 0.0683 1.000
3.2 Methodology
Most studies on the (direct) eﬀect of market concentration on the probabil-
ity of a systemic ﬁnancial crisis use logit probability models (see for example
Demirg¨ uc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) or Beck et al. (2006)). Unlike these
studies, we investigate the indirect impact of concentration on the probability
of a systemic ﬁnancial crisis. This requires a diﬀerent econometric approach.
In a ﬁrst step, we estimate the crisis probability according to eq.(1) in order
to check whether the channels that we consider run in the expected direction,
that is, whether the probability of a systemic crisis is signiﬁcantly determined
by the channel variables. Following the literature, we use a logit model, but we
estimate also other models as robustness check. In a second step, we combine
eq.(1) with eq.(2) and eq.(3) to estimate the eﬀect of concentration on the like-
lihood of ﬁnancial crises, via the considered channels. Tavares and Wacziarg
(2001) follow a similar approach. They set up a simultaneous equations model,
which they estimate by Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS). Given the dummy
character of our dependent variable, we use a two stage approach to estimate
the binary response model in which we endogenize the channel variables and in
this way assess the indirect eﬀect of concentration on ﬁnancial system stability
(fragility).
64 Results
The results are presented according to the described procedure. We ﬁrst assess
the explanatory power of the channel variables, and then turn to the two-stage
regressions to estimate the indirect eﬀect of market concentration and test for
evidence on the concentration-stability and/or -fragility hypothesis.
4.1 One Stage estimates
Table 3: Systemic crisis
Dependent variable:
systemic crisis Probit Logit Cloglog LPM Probit Probit
roa -4.211** -7.843*** -7.001*** -0.461* -4.258** -4.662*
(1.635) (2.983) (2.403) (0.271) (1.715) (2.545)
nim 4.120*** 8.808*** 8.458*** 0.319*** 3.068* 4.720*
(1.411) (2.966) (2.818) (0.110) (1.639) (2.627)
conc -0.329 -0.921 -0.942 -0.0175 -0.155 -0.244
(0.312) (0.757) (0.743) (0.0159) (0.361) (0.428)








Constant -1.980*** -3.591*** -3.578*** 0.0233** -1.505*** -1.733***
(0.231) (0.543) (0.531) (0.0119) (0.302) (0.396)
No. of. obs. 1938 1938 1938 1938 1200 1003
Log likelihood -203.665 -204.088 -204.217 -158.846 -121.838
Wald chi2(3;4;7) 14.46 15.32 16.88 9.57 20.77 18.63
Prob>chi2 0.0023 0.0016 0.0007 0.0225 0.0004 0.009
R2 0.0098
Notes: Cloglog denotes the complementary log-log model, LPM the linear probability model.
dep ins: Dummy variable on deposit insurance, equals one if there is a deposit insurance
scheme, zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3 summarizes the ﬁndings of the non-instrumented regressions, using
diﬀerent binary response models. The results show that both channel variables
- roa (return on assets) and nim (net interest margin) - aﬀect the crisis probabil-
ity signiﬁcantly and in the direction suggested by the theory, irrespective of the
particular estimation model.11 We also use the complementary log-log model
for comparison due to its characteristics to cope with unequally distributed
data, which conﬁrms these ﬁndings.12 In line with the concentration-stability
hypothesis, the negative coeﬃcient on roa suggests that countries with more
proﬁtable banks, i.e. higher values of return on asset, are less prone to ﬁnancial
crises. At the same time however, we ﬁnd that - supporting the concentration-
fragility hypothesis - higher net interest margins are associated with a higher
11For the comparison of binary models and parameter estimates see for example Cameron
and Trivedi (2009), chapter 14.
12In our case it concerns the few observations on crisis compared to non-crisis observations.
7crisis probability.13 Unlike previous studies, we ﬁnd no evidence for a direct
eﬀect of market concentration on the likelihood of a systemic ﬁnancial crisis.
Taken together, we interpret these results as preliminary indication that con-
centration may have an indirect but not a direct eﬀect on ﬁnancial stability. In
column 5 we add a binary variable for deposit insurance. Unlike other stud-
ies, our results suggest that countries with a deposit insurance scheme are less
likely to experience a systemic crisis.14 The standard moral hazard argument
claims that the presence of a safety net such as a deposit insurance scheme
enhances the riskiness of banks, which increases their default risk and therefore
the likelihood of a systemic crisis. However, considering that previous studies
usually use a composite “moral hazard” index, which takes on higher values the
more generous a deposit insurance scheme is, our ﬁndings may not necessarily
be conﬂicting with their results (see for example Beck et al. (2006) or Evrensel
(2008)).
In the last column, we check for the robustness of our results, controlling
for additional measures, such as the political and economic environment, or
stock market conditions. The channel variables turn out to be quite robust
against controlling for other determinants. While the coeﬃcient on per capita
income is insigniﬁcant, the results suggest that a higher stock market turnover is
associated with a higher crisis probability. This indicates the strong integration
of banks and stock markets. Finally, we ﬁnd that countries with a higher current
account balance to GDP ratio are less likely to be hit by a ﬁnancial crisis. Taking
this ratio as a proxy for economic stability, this result implies that governments
may signiﬁcantly contribute to ﬁnancial stability.
Summing up, our results show that both channel variables signiﬁcantly af-
fect the likelihood of ﬁnancial crises in the way suggested by the theory. Fur-
thermore, we ﬁnd no evidence of a direct eﬀect of concentration on the crisis
probability. In order to test the full stability and fragility hypotheses we need
to endogenize the channel variables, i.e. accounting for the fact that market
concentration determines the channel variables. In the next section, the results
of the two stage model are presented.
4.2 Two Stage estimates
In order to estimate the indirect eﬀect of market concentration on the probabil-
ity of a systemic crisis we need to simultaneously estimate eq.(1), (2) and (3).
To do this, we estimate a two stage probit and a two stage linear probability
model. Results are summarized in Table 4.
From the results for the second stage it becomes evident that all coeﬃcients
are signiﬁcant and have the expected sign. As in the one stage estimates, higher
return on asset is associated with a lower crisis probability, whereas higher net
interest margins enhance the likelihood of a systemic ﬁnancial crisis. In recent
13Since the interpretation of parameter estimates is not straightforward in non-linear models,
we calculate marginal eﬀects (at the mean value of each corresponding regressor). They are
reported in Table A.3 in the Appendix.
14See for example Demirg¨ uc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2002).
8Table 4: Systemic crises - two stage estimates
Second stage
sys cris Probit LPM Probit LPM
roa -10.319*** -1.066*** -12.824* -1.000
(3.905) (0.524) (7.371) (0.694)
nim 4.167* 0.352* 13.132*** 0.798***
(2.391) (0.190) (4.112) (0.259)
dep ins -0.478*** -0.042* -0.384* -0.041***
(0.192) (0.021) (0.202) (0.018)
Constant -1.640*** 0.057*** -2.195 0.034
(0.233) (0.022) (0.349) (0.023)
No. of obs. 1118 1118 1194 1194
Wald chi2(3) 15.18 9.35 23.39 33.00








conc 0.0065* 0.0066* 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.038) (0.038)
gdp cap 5.62e-08 5.62e-08 -1.5e07** -1.5e-07**
(6.98e-08) (6.98e-08) (7.16e-08) (7.16e-08)
gdp growth 0.00053*** 0.00053*** -0.00015 -0.00015
(0.00019) (0.00019) (0.00017) (0.00017)
cost inc -0.0275*** -0.0275*** -0.044** -0.044**
(0.00367) (0.00367) (0.0039) (0.0039)
dep ins 0.00006 0.00006 -0.0042* -0.0042*
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Constant 0.0133*** 0.0133*** 0.039*** 0.039***
(0.00426) (0.00426) (0.0043) (0.0043)








conc -0.00384 -0.00384 -0.0137*** -0.0137***
(0.00271) (0.00271) (0.0047) (0.0047)
gdp cap -4.07e-07*** -4.07e-07*** -1.58e-06*** -1.58e-06***
(5.47e-08) (5.47e-08) (8.70e-08) (8.70e-08)
gdp growth -0.00113*** -0.00113*** -0.0025*** -0.0025***
(0.000149) (0.000149) (0.0002) (0.0002)
cost inc -0.00824*** -0.00824*** -0.0039 -0.0039
(0.00287) (0.00287) (0.0049) (0.0049)
dep ins 0.00151 0.00151 -0.0082*** -0.0082***
(0.00156) (0.00156) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Constant 0.0253*** 0.0253*** 0.0926*** 0.0926***
(0.00333) (0.00333) (0.0052) (0.0052)
No. of obs. 1118 1118 1194 1194
Adj.R2 0.7799 0.3067
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,* p<0.1.
9years, a few studies have shown that bank proﬁts tend to be time-persistent.15
Taking this into account, in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 4, (on the ﬁrst stage)
we control for the one-period lagged values of the channel variables.16 However,
due to the two stage binary response structure of our model, the coeﬃcients
of the channel variables are being estimated by standard least squares and
may therefore be biased and inconsistent. For this reason, we additionally i)
run regressions without the lagged channel variables, and ii) estimate the ﬁrst
stage, i.e. the channel variables, separately, using a GMM model. The results
are displayed in the second two columns of Table 4 and Table 5, respectively. As
we see from Table 4, the results on the second stage remain largely unchanged,
when we omit the lagged channel values. On the ﬁrst stage, however, now
concentration turns out to be signiﬁcant.17 The results of the GMM estimates
can be found in Table 5. Interestingly, concentration turns out to have a highly
signiﬁcant eﬀect on both channel variables, with the “correct” (positive) sign,
as suggested by the theory.
In summary, we interpret our ﬁndings as strong support for the concentration-
stability hypothesis and a somewhat weaker evidence for the concentration-
fragility hypothesis.








gdp cap -7.27e-07*** -1.08e-06***
(2.96e-08) (5.50e-08)
gdp growth 0.000790*** -0.000646***
(6.31e-06) (7.25e-06)





Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5 Income group eﬀects
Many empirical studies on ﬁnancial crises estimate samples that include both
developed and developing countries. The state of economic development, how-
ever, may aﬀect a country’s susceptibility to ﬁnancial crises. Though in our
15See for example Athanasoglou et al. (2008), Berger et al. (2000), Eichengreen and Gibson
(2001), Goddard et al. (2004).
16Note that, in general, a dynamic estimation model, such as GMM, would be the appro-
priate econometric method, see for example Athanasoglou et al. (2008).
17However, the sign of the eﬀect in the net interest margin estimation contradicts with the
theoretical predictions.
10estimates we control for the state of development by the per capita income-
variable, in this section we split the sample into two sub-samples. Countries,
which belong to the World Bank’s high income group are classiﬁed as developed
countries. All other countries, i.e. low income, lower middle income, and upper
middle income, are grouped as developing countries.
5.1 Low income countries
Table 6 displays the results for low income countries. The ﬁrst two columns
summarize the results of the one stage estimates. The following columns display
the results of the two stage estimates with and without the lagged values of
the channel variables, respectively. Consistent with our previous ﬁndings, the
parameters on the channel variables have the correct sign, and most of them
are signiﬁcant. However, the estimates on the return on asset are much more
signiﬁcant than the ones of net interest margin. As for the entire sample, deposit
insurance is associated with a lower likelihood of systemic crises in developing
countries, and we ﬁnd no evidence of a direct eﬀect of market concentration on
the probability that a ﬁnancial crisis occurs. On the ﬁrst stage, as before, the
parameter on concentration indicates that there is a positive eﬀect on return on
asset. The eﬀect of market concentration on net interest margin is insigniﬁcant.
One reason for this result may be that the net interest margin is being driven
more by other factors than market concentration. In developing countries,
ﬁnancial systems are usually underdeveloped, too. Due to high transaction
costs and missing economies of scale, lending rates are sometimes excessively
high. Therefore, high net interest margins may arise rather due to existing
ineﬃciencies rather than due to high market concentration. As before, we also
estimate the channels separately, using GMM. The results are summarized in
Table 7. The results indicate a strong eﬀect of market concentration on both
channel variables. As suggested by the theory, higher market concentration is
associated with higher proﬁtability, i.e. higher return on assets. Surprisingly,
contrary to theoretical predictions, we ﬁnd that higher market concentration
is related to lower net interest margins. Possibly, net interest margin is a too
weak proxy for testing the concentration-fragility hypothesis. Based on the
argument that banks in concentrated markets have more market power and
therefore charge their borrowers higher rates, which in turn leads borrowers to
take higher risks and ﬁnally enhances the likelihood of default and of a crisis,
the lending rate may be the appropriate “measure”. However, data on lending
rates are quite diﬃcult to get. Other reasons that may drive this result are
discussed in the following sections.
Summing up, in developing countries there is evidence of the concentration-
stability hypothesis, but no evidence of the concentration-fragility hypothesis.
5.2 High income countries
The results for developed countries are summarized in Table 8. As in the previ-
ous section, the ﬁrst two columns show the results for the one stage estimates.
The remaining columns represent the two stage estimates with and without
11Table 6: Low income countries - one and two stage estimates
Second stage
sys cris Probit LPM Probit LPM Probit LPM
roa -3.556** -0.449** -9.685*** -1.099*** -16.790* -1.393
(1.820) (0.216) (4.209) (0.389) (9.278) (1.129)
nim 2.023 0.221 3.729 0.371 22.184** 1.480***
(1.920) (0.177) (2.527) (0.236) (10.689) (0.566)
dep ins -0.536*** -0.055*** -0.519*** -0.052*** -0.449* -0.049***
(0.186) (0.018) (0.217) (0.019) (0.262) (0.221)
conc -0.046 -0.005
(0.463) (0.039)
Constant -1.469*** 0.075*** -1.570*** 0.064*** -2.891*** -0.008
(0.358) (0.033) (0.261) (0.023) (0.856) (0.455)
No. of obs. 686 686 638 638 685 685
Wald chi2(3) 11.91 13.97 10.58 14.98 17.22 15.61
Prob>chi2 0.0180 0.0074 0.0142 0.0018 0.0006 0.00014







conc 0.008 0.008 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
gdp cap 2.63e-07 2.63e-07 1.15e-06 1.15e-06
(6.48e-07) (6.48e-07) (7.38e-07) (7.38e-07)
gdp growth 0.0006** 0.0006** -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (-0.0002) (-0.0002)
cost inc -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.053*** -0.053***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
dep ins -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.014** 0.014** 0.039*** 0.039***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)








conc -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
gdp cap 1.45e-07 1.45e-07 8.27e-07 8.27e-07
(5.04e-07) (5.04e-07) (8.59e-07) (8.59e-07)
gdp growth -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
cost inc -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.114 -0.114
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
dep ins 0.002 0.002 -0.007** -0.007**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.089*** 0.089***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
No. of obs. 638 638 685 685
Adj.R2 0.7010 0.1437
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1








gdp cap 2.28e-07** -7.11e-06***
(1.05e-07) (1.53e-07)
gdp growth 0.000890*** -0.000655***
(7.56e-06) (1.16e-05)





Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
the lagged channel variables, respectively. The one stage estimates do not dif-
fer fundamentally from our precedent ﬁndings.18 The results of the two stage
model instead show some remarkable diﬀerences. First, though the channel
variables still have the correct sign, they are not signiﬁcant. Second, concen-
tration has the predicted sign and is highly signiﬁcant in the regression for roa.
The strong explanatory power of market concentration (for the return on asset)
in developed countries may reﬂect the fact that in developed ﬁnancial systems
bank proﬁts are determined to a much larger extent by market concentration,
whereas in low developed countries other factors such as transaction costs are
much more decisive. The loss of signiﬁcance of the channel variables is most
probably due to the skewness in the data: over the considered time period, our
sample contains only 17 crisis observations. Table 9 summarizes the results of
the GMM estimates for developed countries. It is shown that concentration
enters with the predicted sign and is highly signiﬁcant in both channel regres-
sions. The results of the one stage estimates, according to which the channel
variables are signiﬁcant and support the theoretical predictions, together with
the ﬁndings in the GMM estimates, can be interpreted as evidence for both the
concentration-stability and the concentration-fragility hypothesis.
18However, deposit insurance is no longer signiﬁcant.
13Table 8: High income countries - one and two stage estimates
Second stage
sys cris Probit LPM Probit LPM Probit LPM
roa -28.197*** -1.624*** -26.589 -0.928 -23.250 -1.067
(10.144) (0.571) (17.149) (0.734) (28.675) (1.705)
nim 17.059* 1.236*** -2.914 0.198 7.923 0.794
(8.619) (0.482) (11.655) (0.449) (38.014) (3.099)
dep ins -0.313 -0.016 -0.611* -0.012 -0.619 -0.019
(0.446) (0.024) (0.349) (0.012) (0.837) (0.063)
conc -0.306 -0.008
(0.645) (0.295)
Constant -1.987*** 0.015 -1.283** 0.032* -1.594 0.023
(0.731) (0.036) (0.569) (0.019) (1.884) (0.155)
No. of obs. 514 514 480 480 509 509
Wald chi2(3) 11.22 14.18 1.86 10.88 2.61 4.49
Prob>chi2 0.0242 0.0067 0.6019 0.0124 0.4555 0.2134







conc 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
gdp cap 4.18e-08 4.18e-08 -2.83e-08 -2.83e-08
(4.45e-08) (4.45e-08) (4.44e-08) (4.44e-08)
gdp growth 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
cost inc -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.029***
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.002) (0.002)
dep ins 0.0007 0.0007 -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)








conc 0.0006 0.0006 0.001 0.001
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.002) (0.002)
gdp cap -1.02e-07*** -1.02e-07*** -5.00e-07*** -5.00e-07***
(3.04e-08) (3.04e-08) (5.51e-08) (5.51e-08)
gdp growth -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.0004* -0.0004*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
cost inc -0.002 -0.002 0.006** 0.006**
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.003) (0.003)
dep ins 0.0001 0.0001 -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.047*** 0.047***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
No. of obs. 480 480 509 509
Adj.R2 0.7951 0.2965
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1








gdp cap 2.64e-07*** -4.69e-07***
(6.03e-08) (8.01e-08)
gdp growth 0.000166*** -1.95e-05
(5.45e-05) (1.86e-05)





Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
6 Discussion
One of our main ﬁndings is the lack of a direct eﬀect of market concentration on
systemic crises, once we control for the channel variables. Higher proﬁtability of
banks enhances the stability of the ﬁnancial system; on the contrary, higher net
interest margins expose the system to an increased probability of a ﬁnancial
crisis. Our results indicate that there are diﬀerent channels through which
higher market concentration on the one hand enhances ﬁnancial stability, but
on the other hand reduces stability. The net eﬀect of these two opposing eﬀects
is therefore ambiguous. Due to the complex system that we estimate - a two
stage binary response model with a dynamic panel structure in the ﬁrst stage -
signiﬁcance levels are volatile and vary. However, given the results, we conclude
to have evidence on both the concentration-stability and the concentration-
fragility hypothesis, which supports the theory.
We ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences between developed and developing countries.
In particular, in developing countries higher market concentration is associ-
ated with lower net interest margins, while the opposite is true for developed
countries. We ﬁnd two possible explanations for this result. First, we measure
market concentration by the ratio of the assets held by the three largest banks
to total assets. Quite reasonably, in ﬁnancial systems in developing countries
there are fewer banks (possibly only a handful) than in developed countries.
Therefore, the concentration ratio may be high not because of the high market
power of the three largest ﬁrms, but rather because there are no or only a few
competitors. Hence, market concentration only loosely grasps market power of
ﬁrms. A second reason for this counterintuitive ﬁnding may be that it is driven
by institutional factors we have not controlled for yet. Future research on ﬁ-
nancial crises should explicitly consider the diﬀerences between developed and
developing countries by controlling for diﬀerences in institutional and regula-
tory structures. There may be signiﬁcant interactions between those measures
and the performance of ﬁnancial systems. Finally, net interest margin may be
15a weak proxy for testing the concentration-fragility hypothesis, since in devel-
oping countries high margins may particularly reﬂect inherent ineﬃciencies due
to high transaction costs and missing economies of scale, respectively.
Finally, we want to point to the related, but separate literature dealing with
the interaction between concentration, competition and stability.19 Matutes
and Vives (1996) suggest that concentration is not a consistent signal of com-
petition. Beck (2008) states that the market structure measures that are used
to measure competition, such as diﬀerent concentration ratios, the number of
banks or the Herﬁndahl index, describe the competitive behavior between banks
inappropriately. Beck et al. (2006) investigate the eﬀect of market concentra-
tion on ﬁnancial stability, controlling for diﬀerent competition measures. They
show that higher concentration and higher competition at the same time have
a positive eﬀect on system stability. They conclude that market concentration
may reﬂect something else than market power. Demirg¨ uc-Kunt et al. (2004)
stress that though many studies use concentration as a signal of competitive-
ness, its interpretation may be more complex. They suggest that concentration
reﬂects other factors such as regulatory restrictions on competition, eﬃcient-
structure forces, and market power by banks. Future research should take
account of these broader aspects to get a better understanding of the inter-
action between market concentration, competition and the channels through
which they aﬀect the stability of the system.
7 Conclusions
The theoretical literature on the relationship between market structure and
ﬁnancial crises claims that market concentration aﬀects the occurrence of ﬁ-
nancial crises through speciﬁc channels, which suggest two opposing hypothe-
ses. We test the signiﬁcance of two particular channels regarding the return
on assets and the net interest margins empirically. We use one- and two stage
binary response models to assess the signiﬁcance of the channel variables and
the indirect eﬀect of concentration (via the channel variables) on the likelihood
of systemic crises. We complement the results with GMM regressions in order
to take account of the time persistent character of the channel variables.
Evidence for the concentration-stability and/or concentration-fragility hy-
pothesis requires that i) the channel variables signiﬁcantly aﬀect the crisis prob-
ability and ii) market concentration is a signiﬁcant determinant of the channel
variables. Our results suggest that the signiﬁcance of the channel variables is
given. In all our estimations, the channel variables have the correct sign, and
in most cases are statistically signiﬁcant. The results hold for diﬀerent econo-
metric models, and they are robust against controlling for other determinants.
The results on the eﬀect of concentration on the channel variables are weaker.
Our ﬁndings show that higher concentration is associated with higher return
on assets, as suggested by the theory. However, we ﬁnd only weak support for
a signiﬁcant eﬀect of market concentration on net interest margins.
19A good literature overview is given in Berger et al. (2004).
16In order to take account of the diﬀerences between developed and develop-
ing countries, we split the sample and estimate the regressions separately. For
developing countries, we ﬁnd strong evidence for the concentration-stability
hypothesis, but no evidence for the concentration-fragility hypothesis. In ad-
dition, in developing countries the results suggest that higher concentration is
associated with lower net interest margins. It may be that net interest margin
is only a weak proxy for testing the concentration-fragility hypothesis. Based
on the argument that banks in concentrated markets have more market power
and therefore charge their borrowers higher rates, which in turn leads borrow-
ers to take higher risks and ﬁnally enhances the likelihood of default and of a
crisis, the lending rate may be the appropriate “measure”. However, data on
lending rates are quite diﬃcult to get. In developed countries, the evidence for
the concentration-stability hypothesis is signiﬁcant. Furthermore, there is also
evidence for the concentration-fragility hypothesis.
In summary, our ﬁndings provide support for both the concentration-stability
and the concentration-fragility hypothesis. The results for the concentration-
stability hypothesis are clearly more signiﬁcant than for the concentration-
fragility hypothesis. The signiﬁcance of our results vary among the diﬀerent
estimates, which is largely due to the complex structure of the underlying the-
ory.
17References
Allen, F. and D. Gale (2004), “Competition and ﬁnancial stability”, Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 36, 453-480.
Athanasoglou, P., S. Brissimis and M. Delis (2008), “Bank-speciﬁc, industry-
speciﬁc and macroeconomic determinants of bank proﬁtability”, Interna-
tional Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 18, 121-136.
Beck, T. (2008), “Bank competition and ﬁnancial stability: friends or foes?”,
Policy Research Working Paper Series 4656, The World Bank.
Beck, T., A. Demirg¨ uc-Kunt and R. Levine (2000), “A New Database on Fi-
nancial Development and Structure”, World Bank Economic Review, 14,
597-605 (update version May 2009).
Beck, T., A. Demirg¨ uc-Kunt and R. Levine (2005), “Bank concentration and
fragility: impact and mechanics”, NBER Working Paper Series, Working
Paper 11500, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Beck, T. and L. Laeven (2006), “Resolution of Failed Banks by Deposit Insurers
- Cross Country Evidence”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
3920, The World Bank.
Beck, T., A. Demirg¨ uc-Kunt and R. Levine (2006), “Bank concentration, com-
petition, and crises: First results”, Journal of Banking & Finance, 30,
1581-1603.
Beck, T., A. Demirg¨ uc-Kunt and R. Levine (2009), “Financial Institutions and
Markets across Countries and over Time - Data and Analysis”, World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4943, The World Bank.
Berger, A., S. Bonime, D. Covitz, and D. Hancock (2000), “Why are bank prof-
its so persistent? The roles of product market competition, informational
opacity, and regional/macroeconomic shocks”, Journal of Banking and
Finance, 24, 1203-1235.
Berger, A., A. Demirg¨ uc-Kunt, R. Levine and J. Haubrich (2004), “Bank Con-
centration and Competition: An Evolution in the Making”, Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 36(3), 433-451.
Bourke, P. (1989), “Concentration and other determinants of bank proﬁtabil-
ity in Europe, North America and Australia”, Journal of Banking and
Finance, 13, 65-79.
Boyd, J.H. and G. De Nicol´ o (2005), “The Theory of Bank Risk taking and
Competition Revisited”, The Journal of Finance, 60(3), 1329-1343.
Cameron, A.C. and P.K. Trivedi (2009), “Microeconometrics Using Stata”, A
Stata Press Publication, StataCorp LP, College Station, Texas.
18Chang, E., S. Guerra, E. Lima and B. Tabak (2008), “The stability-concentration
relationship in the Brazilian banking system”, International Financial
Markets, Institutions, and Money, 18, 388-397.
Demirg¨ uc-Kunt, A. and E. Detragiache (1998), “The determinants of banking
crises in developing and developed countries”, IMF Staﬀ Papers, 45:1,
81-109.
Demirg¨ uc-Kunt, A. and H. Huizinga (1999), “Determinants of Commercial
Bank Interest Margins and Proﬁtability: Some International Evidence”,
World Bank Economic Review, 13(2), 379-408, Oxford University Press.
Demirg¨ uc-Kunt, A. and E. Detragiache (2002), “Does deposit insurance in-
crease banking system stability? An empirical investigation”, Journal of
Monetary Economics, 49, 1373-1406.
Demirg¨ uc-Kunt, A. and E.J. Kane (2002), “Deposit Insurance around the Globe:
Where Does It Work?”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(2),
175-195.
Demirg¨ uc-Kunt, A., L. Laeven and R. Levine (2004), “Regulations, Market
Structure, Institutions, and the Cost of Financial Intermediation”, Jour-
nal of Money, Credit and Banking, 36(3), 593-622.
Demirg¨ uc-Kunt, A., E.J. Kane and L. Laeven (2007), “Determinants of Deposit-
Insurance Adoption and Design”, Journal of Financial Intermediation,
17(3), 407-438.
Eichengreen, B. and H. Gibson (2001), “Greek banking at the dawn of the new
millennium”, CEPR Discussion Paper 2791, London.
Evrensel, A. (2008), “Banking crisis and ﬁnancial structure: A survival-time
analysis”, International Review of Economics and Finance, 17, 589-602.
Gai, P., N. Jenkinson and S. Kapadia (2007), “Systemic risk in modern ﬁnancial
systems: analytics and policy design”, Journal of Risk Finance, 8(2), 156-
165.
Gai, P., S. Kapadia, S. Millard and A. Perez (2008), “Financial innovation,
macroeconomic stability and systemic crises”, The Economic Journal,
118, 401-426.
Goddard, J., P. Molyneux and J.O.S. Wilson (2004), “The proﬁtability of Euro-
pean banks: a cross-sectional and dynamic panel analysis”, The Manch-
ester School, 72(3), 363-381.
Laeven, L. and F. Valencia (2008), “Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database”,
IMF Working Paper No. 08/224, 1-78.
Matutes, C. and X. Vives (1996), “Imperfect competition, risk taking and reg-
ulation in banking”, European Economic Review, 44, 184-216.
19Molyneux, P. and J. Thornton (1992), “Determinants of European bank prof-
itability: A note”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 16, 1173-1178.
Reinhart C.M. and K.S. Rogoﬀ (2009), “The Aftermath of Financial Crises”,
American Economic Review, 99(2), 466-472.
Rogoﬀ, K.S. (1999), “International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial
Instability”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13(4), 21-42.
Ruiz-Porras, A. (2008), “Banking competition and ﬁnancial fragility: Evidence
from panel data”, Estudios Econ´ omicos, El Colegio de M´ exico, Centro de
Estudios Econ´ omicos, 23(1), 49-87.
Summers, L.H. (2000), “International Financial Crises: Causes, Prevention,
and Cures, The American Economic Review, 90(2), 1-16.
Tavares, J. and R. Wacziarg (2001), “How democracy aﬀects growth”, European
Economic Review, 45, 1341-1378.
20Appendix
Table A.1: Variable description and sources
Variable Description Sources
sys cris Systemic ﬁnancial crisis (dummy (0,1) variable) Laeven and Valencia (2008)
roa Average return on assets (net income/total assets) Beck et al. (2000)
nim Net interest margin Beck et al. (2000)
conc Market concentration (assets of 3 largest banks to total assets) Beck et al. (2000)
gdp cap GDP per capita World Development Indicators
gdp growth GDP per capita growth World Development Indicators
inﬂ Inﬂation World Development Indicators
acc gdp Current account balance to GDP World Development Indicators
dep ins Deposit insurance (dummy (0,1) variable) Laeven and Valencia (2008),
Demirg¨ uc-Kunt et al. (2007)
overhead Overhead costs (to total assets) Beck et al. (2000)
cost inc Cost income ratio Beck et al. (2000)
market cap stock market capitalization to GDP Beck et al. (2000)
turnover stock market turnover ratio Beck et al. (2000)
val traded stock market value traded to GDP Beck et al. (2000)
Table A.2: Full descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
sys cris 6080 0.0203947 0.141358 0 1
roa 1999 0.0125097 0.0.258641 -0.4331444 0.1618286
nim 1938 0.0540555 0.0385981 0.0066786 0.4204413
conc 1999 0.7064695 0.2054826 0.1483518 1
gdp cap 5180 5389.492 8291.519 -30.73989 56189.01
gdp growth 5157 1.955738 6.640281 -50.48989 90.06702
inﬂ 4572 45.91569 578.5301 -21.67503 24411.03
acc gdp 4090 -3.176644 10.2795 -240.4958 86.2235
dep ins 2920 0.4660959 0.4989346 0 1
overhead 1964 0.0458568 0.0293596 0.0017692 0.2697982
cost inc 1984 0.6723418 0.2096135 0.1828 1.91685
market cap 1799 0.4154728 0.5417437 0.0001253 5.005284
turnover 1866 0.402254 0.7091961 0 16.7806
val traded 1889 0.2277678 0.4758368 0 4.435691
Table A.3: Marginal eﬀects
Logit Probit Cloglog
dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx
roa -0.2036 -2.623 -0.184
(0.082) (0.107) (0.067)
nim 0.157 0.189 0.149
(0.085) (0.101) (0.081)
Standard errors in parentheses.
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